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EXPLORING METHODS TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE DATA ON HUMAN
CONTRIBUTIONS TO AVIATION SAFETY
Jon Holbrook
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Hampton, VA
Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and
safety management cultures in aviation. This focus limits the data that are
collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our
understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance
represents a significant source of aviation safety data that includes both desired
and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and
failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance
are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from
those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision
making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing
only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can
draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human
performance data. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight
new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing
an integrated safety picture to better inform safety-related decision making and
policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety-producing
behaviors in addition to safety-reducing behaviors. Opportunities and challenges
in collecting and analyzing the largely unexploited data on desired, safetyproducing operator behaviors are discussed.
Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety
management cultures in aviation. This is evidenced by the extent and range of resources put into
eliminating, reducing the likelihood, reducing the consequences, and conducting investigations
of adverse states or events. This focus, however, limits the data that are collected, the questions
that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in
everyday work. Humans play an integral role in aviation safety. Therefore, human performance
represents a significant source of aviation safety data. Human performance includes both desired
and undesired actions. Most of the time, those actions promote safety, but sometimes those
actions can reduce safety. Commercial aviation hull-loss accidents today are significantly below
1 per million flights, and have been steadily decreasing since the advent of commercial jet
operations in 1958. Since as early as 1967, no year has had more than 4 hull losses per million
flights (Airbus, 2020). While it is difficult, if not impossible, to tease out the individual
contributions of the significant advances that have been made in hardware, software, and human
factors to the steady reduction in these accidents over the years, the fact that hull loss accidents
were exceedingly rare even in the decades preceding these advances suggests that humans have
been making significant contributions to aviation safety throughout its history.When our safety
thinking systematically restricts the data we collect and analyze, however, this restricts our
opportunities to learn from human performance. Importantly, when this restriction is systematic,
it can bias what we learn, which can, in turn, affect our safety policies and decision making.
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Most of our learning about human performance in aviation comes from studying
relatively rare errors and failures. The magnitude of the discrepancy between human
performance that is representative of operations and human performance that is actually analyzed
can be difficult to grasp without data to provide some base rate context. For example, it is widely
reported that human error has been implicated in 70%-80% of aviation accidents (e.g.,
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Additionally, analysis of Line Operational Safety Audit (LOSA)
data indicates that pilots intervene to manage aircraft malfunctions on 20% of normal flights
(PARC/CAST, 2013). If those percentages are examined within the context of 10 years of worldwide jet data (Boeing, 2017), a contingency table can be constructed, depicting Outcome (not
accident or accident) by whether human intervention was identified as being associated with that
outcome (see Figure 1). When only data from errors and failures are analyzed, the vast majority
of human impacts on system performance are largely ignored. Not only does this indicate
significant missed opportunities for learning, but it implies that learning is focused on a very
small sample of non-representative data, which can have significant impacts on what is learned
and how those insights inform safety policies and safety-related decision making.
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Figure 1. Human contributions to safety successes (solid oval) far outweigh their contributions to
failures (dashed oval), but are relatively unstudied and poorly understood. Note: Accident is
defined as hull loss and/or at least one fatality.
While making generalizations from a sample of population data is common practice,
responsible researchers work to ensure that their sample is representative of the population of
interest. Failure to do so can result in sampling bias, in which what is learned from the sample is
erroneously attributed to the larger population. When a sample is systematically nonrepresentative, generalizations from the sample data are suspect. An assertion, for example, that
human error contributes to accidents, therefore removing humans will reduce accidents, ignores
that humans are also a significant source of successful system performance, and in fact contribute
to safety far more than they reduce safety. Indeed, extrapolating from the data in Figure 1
suggests that pilots intervene to keep flights safe over 157,000 times for every time that pilot
error contributes to an accident.
Changing Our Safety Thinking
Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for
collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Hollnagel (2016) has proposed that we update our
definition of safety to include not only minimizing opportunities for undesired states, but also
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maximizing opportunities for desired states. This approach is better aligned to understanding
human performance, which contributes to both. Furthermore, to maximize opportunities to learn
from human performance, data should be collected and analyzed on routine performance, not just
exceptional performance. Learning only from rare events means that learning only occurs rarely.
While learning from frequent successes has the advantages of increasing sample rate, sensitivity,
and timeliness of safety learning, it raises important issues about determining exactly what data
to capture, how to analyze and manage this potentially massive expansion of safety data, and
translating learned insights into policy and design decisions.
Collecting and Analyzing Data on Safety-Producing Behaviors
Most aviation organizations already collect data on operator performance from various
sources, including operator-, observer-, and system-generated data. As we expand our
understanding of what constitutes a safety-relevant occurrence to include both desired as well as
undesired behaviors, this raises questions about the collection of data on operators’ safetyproducing behaviors. Can we leverage data that are already being collected, and are there new
opportunities for data collection based on our expanded safety thinking? Much of the data we
collect are only analyzed for “safety exceedances”. While we are actually collecting significant
data on “what goes right,” even in our safety reporting systems that focus on “what goes wrong,”
our analysis processes do not often consider these data. Similarly, flight data recorders capture
“what happens,” including both desired and undesired actions, but our analyses typically focus
on the undesired. Thus, there are potential opportunities for data collection (i.e., systematically
collecting data on what goes well), as well as data analysis (i.e., analyzing data we have already
collected, but may not have previously considered relevant).
Operator-Generated Data
Operator-generated data include interviews, questionnaires, and event self-reports about
an operator’s own lived experience. These data represent perhaps the best source of insights into
what the operators may have been thinking about, including their motivations, intentions, goals,
and pressures, and how they believe those considerations may have influenced their decisions
and actions. Although some modes of thought are not open to introspection (see Kahneman,
2011), insights can still be gained from how operators think about their thinking. Similarly,
operator-generated data affords an opportunity to learn from how operators talk about their own
safety-producing performance. We have well-established shared terminology for describing
risks, hazards, and errors (e.g., Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003), but do not yet have such a
vocabulary for safety-producing behaviors. Can we identify the parlance already in use for
describing safety-producing behaviors, and can we use that to bootstrap development of a new
safety language that can address both desired and undesired behaviors? This question is explored
elsewhere in these Proceedings by Feldman et al. (2021), using an existing event report
collection: NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Although ASRS reports are
collected for the purpose of describing something that went wrong, they may represent a
valuable source of data on things going well, particularly related to noticing, tracking,
responding to, and learning from the described problem event (e.g., Holbrook et al., 2020).
Observer-Generated Data
Observer-generated data include data from observations of line operations as well as
training and simulated events. These data represent an excellent source of insight into overt
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behaviors, particularly those that may not be salient to operators. This is particularly relevant for
safety-producing behaviors that operators may see as “routine” or “just part of the job” and
therefore may be less likely to self-report those behaviors. In rich and complex environments like
aircraft flight decks, not every behavior is realistically observable – there is simply too much
going on, and not every action is meaningful to capture. Knowledge frameworks are often used
to train and prepare observers for what to focus on. These knowledge frameworks can be thought
of as one way of embodying safety thinking. There are some well-established knowledge
frameworks, such as Threat and Error Management (TEM), which is the basis for LOSA
(Klinect, Wilhelm, & Helmreich, 1999). While TEM uses undesired behaviors and states as the
primary triggers for data collection, this framework still affords opportunities to collect data on
how pilots safely managed threats and errors. American Airlines has developed a “Learning and
Improvement Team” framework for flight line observations that is explicitly designed for the
collection of flight crew resilient performance (American Airlines, 2020). Exploration of how the
knowledge frameworks of observers affect the insights they derive from an observation is
discussed elsewhere in these Proceedings (Mumaw, Billman, & Holbrook, 2021).
System-Generated Data
System-generated data include flight data records as well as documentation of flight
regulations and procedures. Automation enables collecting a large volume of system data on
what is happening, via flight data recordings, with less overhead at the time of collection than
operator- and observer-generated data. Here, the focus on risks and hazards manifests in terms of
which data we choose to analyze – that is, a failure state or adverse event triggers analysis that
leaves the vast majority of collected data unconsidered. Indeed, commercial airlines with Flight
Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs use data from flight data recorders to monitor
daily operations, but often only look at the data from flights with known adverse events (i.e.,
flights that violate some pre-determined “safety exceedance” criterion). “Non-event” flight data
may be analyzed to establish a baseline for comparison, but not as a valuable source of learning,
themselves. These “non-event” flights, however, can afford opportunities for insights into safetyproducing behaviors, such as actions taken by flight crews to mitigate or prevent adverse events
from manifesting (e.g., Holbrook et al., 2019). That is, the occurrence of the adverse event does
not have to be a pre-requisite for learning. The amount of flight data collected opens up
application of “big data” approaches to analysis, and flight data represent an excellent source of
data on quantitative performance parameters, such as timing or frequency. But while flight data
can provide many quantitative details about operator and vehicle performance, they cannot
provide information about the knowledge state, motivation, or broader context for the event. This
information could be obtained through observer- or operator-generated data to supplement
system data and provide a more complete understanding of the event.
Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) Flight Simulation
HITL flight simulations represent an additional approach to collecting data on human
performance. While data from real-world operations offer the most veridical glimpse into
everyday work, HITLs provide opportunities to collect multiple sources of data from the same
event, as well as the capability to more efficiently test new approaches to data collection. One of
the challenges in designing HITL simulations from a safety mindset focused primarily on errors
and failures is that, to have something to measure, scenarios must be designed to induce those
errors and failures, which can be difficult when studying high-performing workers. Ironically, in
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this situation, the resilient, safety-producing performance of the test participants is seen as an
impediment to data collection, rather than important data to be collected – an obstacle that can
sometimes require experimenters to create scenarios that are far-removed from representative
flight operations in order to induce the errors and failures “required” for performance
measurement. Scenarios can be designed, however, to include events and perturbations that
might not otherwise involve enough risk or hazard to trigger data collection or analysis in realworld operations, and thus afford opportunities for observation and measurement of more
“routine” performance. While it is always a concern that participants in any simulation will not
perform in the same manner that they do in actual operations, perhaps this effect may be
somewhat mitigated by designing simulation scenarios that are more representative of real-world
operations. Exploration of HITL simulation as an approach to learning about pilots’ safetyproducing behaviors is discussed elsewhere in these Proceedings (Stephens et al., 2021).
Implications for system design
Changing the way we think about safety is not just relevant to system operators but also
to system designers. Our safety thinking affects our design assumptions, which are influenced by
our understanding of human performance. We are just beginning, however, to build an
understanding of safety-producing behavior. A focus on failure alone can lead to design
assumptions about improving safety by minimizing human roles and the need to protect the
system from error-prone humans. While we certainly should acknowledge human limitations and
the consequences of human error, system designs should also leverage the capabilities of humans
to create and sustain safe operations. If these capabilities are poorly understood, what
assumptions are going into the design of the increasingly autonomous machine systems to which
these functions may be relegated? Challenges and opportunities for system design that leverage
human capabilities and new ways of thinking about safety are expanded upon elsewhere in these
Proceedings (Lachter, Hobbs, & Holbrook, 2021; Nemeth & Holbrook, 2021).
Conclusions
While we should continue to learn from what goes wrong, we should also try to learn
from what goes right. Learning from what goes right can enable us to make data-informed
adjustments to operations and policies without having to wait for something to go wrong.
Changing how we define safety – expanding our understanding of what constitutes a safetyrelevant issue – can inform this learning, and is relevant to both operations and system design.
This expansion in thinking brings with it a need to expand methods of data collection and
analysis, representing an important opportunity for human factors and human performance
communities.
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